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The traditional approach to trade analysis has shown a strong preoccupation with trade in end-
products. There is, of course, a comprehensive and elegant literature on trade in intermediate
products,
1 but it leads a rather separate and cloistered existence. This emphasis finds its underpinnings
in the assumption that production is a spatially concentrated and functionally integrated process.  We
are used to thinking about products as “made” in a country. Trade in components and cross-border
dispersion of production, both characteristics of intra-product specialization, have no place in this
approach.
In the real world, by comparison, offshore component production and assembly have been
among the more noticeable features of recent advances in globalization.  Trade in components is
growing rapidly and the shares of foreign value-added in exports and of domestic value-added in
imports are expanding everywhere.  
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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play an important role in the cross-border dispersion of
production, especially where technology transfer and coordination are important.  This suggests that
the phenomenon may be studied from the firm, as well as the country, perspective.  Markusen (1984)
examines the implications of multiplant operations by MNEs when economies are present in the
concentration of “headquarters” activities such as R&D, marketing, finance, etc., while production
is geographically dispersed.
This paper examines the implications of offshore sourcing under alternative trade policy
regimes.  As shown in Section II, offshore sourcing is unequivocally welfare-enhancing under free
trade, but may raise or lower welfare when trade restrictions are present. Section III looks at offshore
sourcing in low-wage developing countries and examines the implications of rules of origin in that
context.  Section IV concludes the discussion. 
II. Component specialization and trade policy
At given world prices, the cost savings achieved through offshore sourcing improve competitiveness
and create profit opportunities which raise output and employment.
2  When world prices are variable,
such cost-savings allow firms to lower end-product prices and thereby increase sales and raise market123
share.  
We start with the traditional model involving trade in two final products, X and Y, produced
with two factors of production, capital, K, and labor, L.  Figure 5.1 presents the basic analytical
structure, where unit-value isoquants X0 and Y0 reflect the traditional pattern of spatially concentrated
and functionally integrated production technologies.  The initial factor-price ratio, w/r, is consistent
with given world commodity prices.
[Figure 5.1 about here] 
We introduce the possibility of offshore sourcing by assuming that good X, the country’s
labor-intensive, import-competing product consists of  two activities, x1 and x2, the first more and the
second less capital-intensive than the product overall.
3  Suppose that technological breakthroughs
make it possible to physically separate the location of the two activities and that the labor-intensive
component may be obtained from a trading partner at significant cost savings.
Assume that the factor cost of assembling product X is included in the cost of activity x1.
4 
 This implies that the X-industry's production function is now fully described by its x1-isoquants.  The
factor content of a unit of X is the quantity of capital and labor employed in activity x1, plus the
amounts of labor and capital needed to produce the quantity of x1 that will pay for imports of x2.  124
Thus, if imports of x2 were available at zero cost, then the x1-isoquant associated with the original X-
isoquant,  X0, would fully describe the resource cost of producing X0 units of X.  Otherwise, the
resource cost of imports of x2, measured in terms of exports of x1,  must be taken into account.  Then,
the x1-isoquant representing the full resource cost of X0 units of X will lie farther away from the origin
along ray ox1.  We suppose that X11 is that isoquant.
With prices of final goods given in the world market, the cost savings open up profit
opportunities that must be eliminated in order to reestablish equilibrium.  Factor prices adjust until
the new factor-price ratio, (w/r)', is  tangent to the original Y-isoquant and the new X-industry
isoquant, X11.  Capital-labor ratios increase in both industries.
5 
To determine the effect on output and employment, we turn to Figure 5.2.  The improvement
in productivity in the X-industry shifts out the production possibility curve along the horizontal axis.
6
 If Pd is assumed to represent  the relative price between  the two final products under free trade, then
the introduction of offshore sourcing moves the production equilibrium from Q1 to Q2. This shift
clearly raises national welfare.    
[Figure 5.2 about here]125
MFN Trade Policy
We now turn to examine the effect of component specialization in the presence of trade
restrictions.  Suppose that our focus country, country A, imposes a non-discriminatory tariff on
imports of good X.  Suppose that Pw is now the free trade price ratio, so that Pd becomes the
domestic price corresponding to tariff rate t.  The initial equilibrium before the introduction of
offshore sourcing is given by points  Q1 and C1.     When component specialization is introduced in
the import sector, the production possibility curve moves out along the X-axis to TT".  The small-
country assumption ensures that in the world market for end-products, the relative price ratio remains
undisturbed at Pw.   The outward rotation of the production possibility curve causes its tangency
with the domestic price line to move in a south-easterly direction to point Q2, where X-output is
larger than before and Y-output smaller.   Consumption moves to point C2 on indifference curve I2.
 This change represents a clear reduction in national welfare.
7
This is, however, not the only possible outcome.  Consider a steeper world price ratio for the
end products like Pw.’  For convenience, we choose quantities such that a smaller tariff, t,’ applied
to the world price ratio Pw’ again yields a domestic price ratio equal to Pd.  This allows the production
points for the two cases to be identical and thus directly comparable at points Q1 and Q2.  The126
difference in outcomes lies in the consumption equilibria and the change in welfare.  In the second
case, consumption is at point C1' before component specialization and at point  C2' after its
introduction.  The change represents an unambiguous improvement in welfare.      
We conclude, therefore, that introduction of component specialization into an MFN  tariff
situation may raise or lower welfare.  Welfare is more likely to fall as the distortion due to the tariff
rises relative to the efficiency gains generated by component specialization.  In the cases examined,
the efficiency gains are identical by construction, but the tariff is larger in the first, welfare-reducing
situation.  The key result, here, is that implementation of component specialization into a protectionist




Much like traditional trade theory, the customs union literature has also focused on trade in
end products.  As NAFTA (and its predecessor, the maquiladora program) has shown, however, PTAs
may facilitate trade in components.  This section analyzes the implications.
MFN-based protection is the starting point in Figure 5.3, where the object is to assess the127
welfare effects of a preferential trade arrangement (PTA), which frees trade in both end products
and components.  It is, of course, well-known that PTAs may raise as well as reduce welfare,
depending on whether trade-creating elements dominate or fall short of trade-diverting influences.
[Figure 5.3 about here]
Production is initially at Q and consumption at C.  Formation of the trade area is assumed to
change the price of X  from Pd to Ppta.  The price change shifts domestic production from Q to Q’ and
imports to the trade partner.  The change in the output bundle moves productive resources away from
X toward Y.  In the figure, the outcome represented is welfare-reducing, with consumption now at
C' and thus on a lower indifference curve than C.   We know from the theory of customs unions,
however, that welfare improvements are also possible.
If formation of the free trade area is accompanied by intra-product specialization in the X-
sector, then the production possibility curve expands along the X-axis.
9 The tangency point between
Ppta and the new production possibility curve moves down to Q”.  We once again encounter the
familiar result of rising  X-output and falling Y-output.  Consumption moves to C" and hence to a
higher indifference curve.   Component specialization thus mitigates the negative welfare effects of
this free trade agreement. More importantly, whereas component specialization may reduce welfare128
when it is introduced into an environment of MFN protection, it unambiguously augments welfare
in the context of a preferential trade arrangement.   
Terms-of-trade effects come into play when country A is a large member of the PTA, for then
the increase in X-output in the region (and decrease in Y-output) will tend to depress the relative price
of X, causing the PTA price ratio to rotate in a counter-clockwise manner and leading to a further
increase in national welfare.
Factor Prices and Factor Proportions
This section examines the implications for factor prices and factor allocation by referring back
to Figure 5.1.  Suppose that the initial commodity price ratio, for which isoquants X0 and Y0 are
defined, is the MFN price ratio Pd of Figure 5.3.  Then, introduction of the PTA and the resultant
change in the price ratio to Ppta shifts the family of X-isoquants out from the origin in Figure 5.1,
while moving the family of Y-isoquants in toward the origin in order to reflect, respectively,
reductions in the price of end-product X and increases in the price of end-product Y.  These shifts are
not shown in the figure to avoid congestion, but it is clear that outward relocation of X-isoquants
reduces the wage-rental ratio and inward relocation of Y-isoquants reinforces that adjustment.  129
This, of course, is the well-known Stolper-Samuelson result that a decline in the relative price
of a commodity reduces the relative price of the factor used intensively in its production.  What is
important for present purposes, however, is that this change in factor prices is orthogonal to the effect
on factor prices of component specialization in the X-industry.  The net effect thus depends on the
relative strengths of the two tendencies.   If the effect of preferential trade liberalization on
commodity prices is large relative to the cost-savings of component specialization, then the wage-
rental ratio will fall.  From the point of view of workers, therefore, component specialization should
be a welcome feature of any trade agreement that introduces tougher price competition at the level
of end products.
This result is pertinent to the fears of NAFTA critics.  If introduction of the free trade area
brings only a decline in the price of the import-competing end-product, X, then wages in the industry
will come under pressure and employment and output will decline.  To the extent, however, that the
free trade area also encourages intra-product specialization in the X-industry, wages will fall less or
even rise and industry output and employment will fall less or even rise.
10  If the effect of intra-
product specialization dominates the terms-of-trade effect, workers will be better off and jobs will
be more plentiful in the import-competing end-product industry than before. 130
If the main effect of a PTA with a low-wage country is to introduce component specialization
in the import-competing sector, perhaps because the end-product price is governed by trade relations
with non-members and thus unaffected by the arrangement, then it will be welfare-enhancing.  This
consideration may be part of a country’s strategic objective in joining a preference area, namely, to
capture the cost-saving benefits of cross-border component production for the competitive struggle
with non-members in end-product markets.    
III.  Repercussions in the partner country
During implementation of the PTA, partner country B removes tariffs on imports of Y from country
A and as a result the price of Y falls in B.  In Figure 5.4, the price change is reflected in a shift of the
unit-value isoquant from Y0 to Y0'.  This raises the wage-rental ratio from w/r to (w/r)', with
tangencies to the new Y-sector isoquant and the original X-isoquant at points a and b, respectively.
[Figure 5.4 about here]
In addition to the change in the terms of trade, the PTA clears the way for component
specialization in the X-sector.  For country B, component specialization means that it abandons
production of component x1 in favor of imports from country A.  Consequently, the X-industry's 131
production technology is now represented by the x2-isoquants (which are assumed to include the
resource cost of assembling the end product).  We assume that the relevant new isoquant is X21
(which would be tangent to the original factor-price ratio (w/r)on a lower expansion path than ox).
Expansion paths for component x1 have not been drawn in order to avoid cluttering.  The new
equilibrium factor-price ratio must reflect both the terms-of-trade change and the cost savings of
component specialization, that is, it must be tangent to Y0' and X21.  That ratio is (w/r)", which causes
capital-labor ratios to rise to oy’ and ox2', respectively.  Component specialization in the country’s
export industry clearly reinforces the terms-of-trade effect on the factor-price ratio.
11 
There may, however, be a further effect which works in the opposite direction. It will be
recalled from the earlier discussion that X-output rises in country A, when that country specializes
in component x1, while importing component x2 from country B.  Component specialization in the X-
industries of the two countries thus raises X-output in the area.  If the additional supply of X coming
to markets is large relative to demand shifts, then it will depress the relative price of X in the PTA.
 While such an event would be beneficial for country A, it would represent a terms-of-trade
deterioration for country B and would thus undercut the improvement in the wage-rental ratio.  
[Figure 5.5 about here]132
Figure 5.5 examines the effects of these developments on country B's national welfare.  The
terms-of-trade effect of the PTA is represented by the rotation of the price line from Pb to Ppta.  In
the case shown, the PTA has been drawn to be trade-diverting for country B, with consumption
moving to C’ prior to implementation of component specialization.  That specialization shifts the
production possibility curve out along the X axis.  Production shifts to Q", while consumption moves
to point C". 
Thus, while standard inter-product specialization among the members of a preference area
may raise or lower national welfare, the effect of intra-product specialization is unambiguously
welfare-enhancing.  In the case shown, intra-industry specialization of the component type transforms
a welfare-reducing PTA into a welfare-creating one.  In general, PTAs which stimulate intra-product
specialization among members will be more beneficial than those which do not. 
Rules of Origin
When the option of component trade is introduced into an MFN system, components will be
obtained from the lowest cost source.  The bias inherent in preferential trade arrangements, however,
has the effect of diverting component trade to the partner country for the same reasons that trade in133
end products is diverted.  In free trade areas, with their uncoordinated tariff policies, such diversion
may be further encouraged by  rules of origin.  Any tendency for rules of origin to shift sourcing of
components from low-cost outsiders to higher-cost partners erodes the cost savings inherent in
component specialization.  This is an inefficiency which prevents the production possibility curve from
shifting out as far as otherwise and thereby reduces the welfare gains.  Rules of origin thus keep
countries from fully exploiting the benefits of intra-product specialization. 
IV. Concluding observations
While outsourcing of parts and components has long been a feature of production in many branches
of manufacturing, offshore sourcing and, more importantly, offshore production of parts and
components appears to have become more prominent and more widely practiced in recent years.  This
upsurge has doubtless been facilitated by innovations in communications and transportation and by
trade liberalization at both multilateral and regional levels.
Under conditions of free trade, extension of the international division of labor to the level of
parts and component activities is welfare-creating.  If component production is subject to variations
in factor intensities, it will affect comparative advantage across countries. Hence, intra-product134
specialization will be welfare-enhancing.  If component production is subject to economies of scale,
then geographic concentration of a component’s production will bring further welfare gains.
While this basic principle applies regardless of whether trade is free or not, the welfare effects
of intra-product specialization are not independent of the trade regime.  In the presence of MFN
tariffs, for example, introduction of intra-product specialization in the import-competing sector may
raise or lower national welfare. When intra-product specialization is introduced in the context of a
preferential trade arrangement, on the other hand, national welfare is increased unambiguously.  Thus,
any tendency for a preference area to generate trade in components increases the likelihood that it
will be welfare-improving.
Finally, to the extent that rules of origin and local content requirements force firms to shift
sourcing of components from low-cost non-members to higher-cost members, they are welfare-
reducing.135
   Endnotes
* I am indebted to Alan Deardorff, Ronald Jones and Henryk Kierzkowski and to conference
 participants for valuable comments and suggestions.
1 For examples of that literature, see  Ethier (1984), Hazari, Sgro, and Suh (1981), and Sanyal
and Jones (1982). 
2  See Arndt (1997, 1998a,b), Deardorff (1998), and  Jones and Kierzkowski (1997).
3 The capital-labor ratio along expansion path ox is thus the weighted average of the capital-labor
ratios of the two component activities.
4This assumption makes assembly and production of component x1 non-separable.  If assembly is
modeled as a separate activity, then it may also be cheaper offshore. 
5 For additional details, see Arndt (1997, 1998a,b).
6 For details, see Arndt (1997, 1998a,b). See Johnson (1971) for a classic study of trade and
technical progress.  See also Hazari et al. (1981) for an example from the earlier literature on136
trade in intermediate products. For an application to the economics of multi-plant operations by
MNEs, see Markusen (1984).
7 See Johnson (1967) for a related discussion concerning protection and technical progress.
8  For a small country, the shift to offshore sourcing does not affect the terms of trade.  A large
country, on the other hand, may affect global supply conditions when X-output rises and Y-output
falls and thereby turn the terms of trade in its favor.  In that case, the world price line would
rotate in a counter-clockwise direction with obvious welfare-enhancing consequences.
9  It is immaterial in the first instance whether offshore sourcing involves the partner country or
the outsider.  If the latter is the low-cost producer of the component and there are no
discriminatory trade barriers on components, then component imports will originate there. 
Preferential treatment of component imports from the PTA partner, as under rules of origin, is
considered below.
10 In the 2x2 world with completely integrated labor markets and perfectly mobile labor, the effect137
on factor prices spreads throughout the economy.  In the real world, the spillover will be more
limited; it may spread to neighboring industries or regions, but need not affect the entire economy.
11  The intellectual foundations of the present analytical approach are to be found in the literature
on trade and technical progress.  That literature finds that output and employment will rise in a
sector which enjoys technical progress except when that progress is ‘saving’ in the sector’s non-
intensive factor, in which case the outcome is ambiguous.  Thus, for example, output may rise or
fall in the capital-intensive sector if technical progress is labor-saving.  It is shown in Arndt (2000)
that there is no ambiguity. 138
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Figure 5.5